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A B S T R A C T
The study addresses the question of how to achieve and sustain well-functioning local service delivery in in-
stitutionally diﬃcult contexts, characterised by low levels of generalised trust, widespread corruption and poor
institutions. We study a relatively successful case of decentralized electriﬁcation in Tanzania, and the process
whereby an international NGO establishes a small-scale hydropower system with a local utility to own and
operate it. Building on institutional theory, we investigate how to build trust in an organization, through a
strategy of credible commitment; and how free-riding problems can be handled in a local development project.
The qualitative study includes 119 semistructured interviews with project staﬀ, villagers, and local and district
government, observations and document analysis. The results indicate the importance of a positive ‘history of
play’, sustained over time, and keeping distance from corrupt institutions, in order to build trust. Strict en-
forcement of rules was decisive for handling free riding behaviours, and impartiality in enforcement for per-
ceptions of legitimacy and trustworthiness. Deviations undermined relations of trust. The results add nuance to
more generic theoretical propositions and provide insights on un/intended consequences of institutional stra-
tegies. These are relevant for creating and sustaining local service organizations for electricity access and other
public goods.
1. Introduction
Implementation of ‘community electriﬁcation projects’ in poor rural
communities become arenas where local politics and institutions en-
counter the ﬁnancial and engineering logics of electricity provision as
well as the donor-driven development logic of ‘participatory develop-
ment’. The Sustainable Development Goal 7: to ‘ensure access to af-
fordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’ highlights the
importance of modern energy services for development, but does not
signal how much contestation and negotiation external and local actors
providing and using such services are engaged in. In this paper, we
approach the overarching question of how to achieve and sustain well-
functioning local service delivery, in contexts characterised by poverty,
low trust and corruption. We do so by drawing on institutional theory
and a case study of a mini hydropower plant in the Southern Highlands
in Tanzania.
In sub-Saharan Africa, decentralized (‘oﬀ-grid’) and small-scale
service solutions are increasingly contributing to electricity access for
the rural population and there are many potential system conﬁgura-
tions of various sizes that can cater to diﬀerent needs and contexts.
Unfortunately, previous work on energy and development clearly de-
monstrates that in the sub-Saharan region rural electriﬁcation projects
in general, and not least decentralized energy systems, tend to result in
less positive impact than anticipated and face signiﬁcant obstacles
[1–8].
Whereas in many locations, local power stations and grids provide
aﬀordable, reliable and sustainable electricity services and support
economic and industrial development, the experience in sub-Saharan
Africa, as well as in other poor regions of the world, has been dis-
appointing with a large number of poorly functioning systems, or failed
service delivery [9–12]. Still, new investments in local generation and
micro and mini grids are currently being made [13,14] and the Inter-
national Energy Agency ([15]: 496) expects in their New Policies Sce-
nario that around 140 million people in sub-Saharan Africa will be
connected to between 100,000 and 200,000 mini-grids by 2040.
The current energy literature – in rich as well as poorer countries –
is dominated by technical and economic studies [16]. A small, but
growing, body of work explores social, cultural, political and institu-
tional (as well as technical and economic) aspects of decentralized
electricity supply in the context of rural and/or poor communities
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[17–31]. These have provided crucial insights on the reasons why
projects achieve their goals or not, and why electricity access does not
necessarily translate into poverty alleviation.
A number of studies address political and institutional barriers and
frameworks at inter/national level related speciﬁcally to the diﬀusion
of (small-scale) renewable energy systems for expanding electricity
access [1,32–37]. However, there is a signiﬁcant gap in the current
energy and development literature regarding political and institutional
challenges at the local level; and the role of the functioning and design
of institutions in explaining why many micro and mini-grids fail to
sustain well-functioning service delivery (for an exception see [38]).
Given the lack of institutional theoretical grounding in the current lit-
erature on decentralized electricity provision, we will build on theories
from the wider set of literatures that apply institutional perspectives on
development, aid and public service delivery. Institutions, or the “rules
of the game” [39] can be informal (norms, codes of conduct) or formal
(constitutions, laws). They shape and constrain individual and collec-
tive actors’ beliefs, expectations and behavior, and are therefore central
in understanding the outcomes of collective processes [40,41]. In the
present study, much focus is on institutions in terms of the rules gov-
erning the electricity utility, and the organization around as well as the
enforcement of these rules.
Using qualitative research methodology, we study the process
whereby an international non-governmental organization (NGO) im-
plements a rural electriﬁcation project and establishes a small-scale
hydropower station and mini-grid, and a local utility to own and op-
erate these. The case represents a relatively successful institution
building process in a diﬃcult context, and we move from generic the-
oretical propositions in the wider literature on institution building in
challenging contexts to the richness of the empirical case and back
again, helping inform theory and shed new light on the mechanisms
through which a ‘diﬃcult’ institutional context (Tanzania is typical in
this respect) challenges decentralized electricity provision. Far from
seeing electriﬁcation projects as neutral welfare schemes, our analysis
engages with local politics, conﬂicts, and struggles over resources and
inﬂuence [42]. Importantly, we contribute new knowledge regarding
viable strategies for institution building in these contexts. This is, per-
haps surprisingly, a gap in current knowledge. Despite the vast amount
of studies in the ‘good governance’ ﬁeld, this literature does little in
explaining instances of good governance within contexts of poor gov-
ernance. While ‘poor governance’ clearly is a very sticky problem, there
are nevertheless examples of organizations that – against what would
be expected from the surrounding institutional environment – manage
to bring corruption under control (see [43]). More research on these
unusual successful cases is needed, and some of the insights from our
case of electricity provision are, hence, relevant for other kinds of
service delivery. Finally, existing studies of institution building in dif-
ﬁcult contexts have mainly focused on government at various levels.
Very little, if any, prior work has sought to understand how some non-
governmental development projects succeed despite unfavourable
preconditions.
This article examines how the institutional context, in terms of trust
levels, levels of corruption and clientelistic relations, impact on the
processes of institution building in local utilities, and which strategies
are adopted to meet those challenges. There are two research questions.
We investigate ﬁrst how trust in an organization can be built, to the
extent that people are prepared to invest in the organization for long-
term gain. Second, we study how free-riding problems can be handled
and the degree to which it is considered eﬀective and legitimate. We are
aware of the uniqueness of our case and its context, however, the
grounding in theory and case selection [44,45] allow us to inform
theory and identify more generic empirical lessons that can be helpful
for other scholars and of strategic interest to practitioners.
The next section describes the context in which the development
project is set and introduces the case. This is followed by a theoretical
section, where we review literature on the role of institutions and
institution building, mainly from the ﬁelds of comparative politics and
development, relevant to understand the challenges facing the im-
plementing organization. After a section on methodology, we report the
results. The ﬁrst part of the empirical section engages with the research
question on trust building, and the second part with enforcement. The
ﬁnal section concludes.
2. The case and the context
The project we have chosen to study is a hydropower project in the
village Mawengi, located in Ludewa District in the Southern highlands
in Tanzania. Governmental stakeholders as well as donors consider the
Mawengi project a very successful example of rural electriﬁcation.
Since 2010, Mawengi and neighbouring villages in the area are supplied
with electricity from a 300 kW hydropower station in the Kisongo river.
The power station is owned and operated by the local utility organi-
zation LUMAMA. The process of initiating, constructing and operating
the electricity system has been described in detail elsewhere [18]. In
short, the local Catholic church took initiative and contacted the in-
ternational development cooperation organization ACRA (Co-
operazione Rurale in Africa e America Latina). ACRA carried out a
feasibility study in 2005, successfully applied for project funding, and
started the construction process in 2006. Towards the end of the con-
struction phase, informal collaboration was formalised through the
establishment of a local utility organization named LUMAMA as a legal
entity to own and operate the system once service delivery started.
ACRA exited the project in 2014, by which time LUMAMA was able to
handle daily operation and customer service delivery as well as main-
tenance and repair of infrastructure. In 2015 the utility delivered high-
quality electricity services to around 1500 customers, with very few
blackouts and at a reasonable cost. The electricity services were widely
appreciated by the users and included public goods, such as outdoor
lights and improvement of public services through electriﬁcation of
schools and medical centres. Electricity facilitated economic develop-
ment, for example by making milling signiﬁcantly cheaper (compared
to diesel generators) or less time-consuming than milling by hand. Local
enterprises, such as tailoring, barbers, furniture and mechanical work-
shops, were able to improve their services and oﬀer new ones, like
phone charging.
The Mawengi project was implemented in Tanzania, which provides
a challenging institutional context in terms of poor institutions, cor-
ruption and low trust. In Tanzania, there is an uncertain legal en-
vironment for organizations to operate in. According to the World
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, Tanzania scores low on both
Rule of law, Regulatory quality, and Control of corruption [46]. The
lack of control of corruption is reﬂected in perceptions about corrup-
tion. According to the East African Bribery Index 2014, 68% of the
respondents in Tanzania described the level of corruption in their re-
spective country as high and felt it had increased in the past 12 months
[47]. Moreover, levels of generalised trust are relatively low in Tan-
zania. According to the 2005 Global Barometer Survey, 87% of the
respondents agreed with the statement that ‘You must be very careful in
dealing with people’ [48]. Similar characteristics regarding the quality
of institutions and trust levels apply to many countries, in sub-Saharan
Africa as well as in other parts of the world, making Tanzania a relevant
and representative case to learn from.
3. Theoretical framework
The existing literature on institution-building is broad and concerns
many diﬀerent sectors, organizational levels and phenomena. In order
to relate more general theoretical propositions to the type of projects
and processes we study, we will exemplify and specify challenges often
faced by actors within development cooperation, and how we approach
these theoretically.
Donor-funded and NGO-driven projects working with service
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provision can face two related problems: (1) how to become a trust-
worthy organization in the eyes of people in the area, and (2) how to
make the service providing organization a credible enforcer to avoid
project failure due to free-riding.
Before we turn to the more general theoretical propositions, we will
illustrate how these problems can manifest themselves by using ex-
amples from the project under study. Regarding the ﬁrst problem,
ACRA asked for substantive contributions from people in the area –
both in terms of land and labour – in order to get distant returns. This is
common development practice in Tanzania [49]. Land was needed for
transformers, lines, and other parts of the infrastructure. Labour was
needed to dig trenches for cables, erecting poles, etc. Moreover, private
economic investments by future customers were required: they needed
to pay for internal wiring before service delivery could start. Many of
the contributions had to be made years before the (uncertain) beneﬁts
would come. Thus, in the ﬁrst project phase the challenge for ACRA was
to make people trust the organization to the extent that they were
willing to invest for the future.
Regarding the second problem, new challenges arose when elec-
tricity service provision started in Mawengi. It became necessary to
handle the collective action problem (CAP) of free-riding. Although
there are important diﬀerences between the electricity system and what
we think of as public goods – personal access (but not indirect access) to
electricity was in principle both excludable and rivalrous as the system
could suﬀer from overload – there were ways in which it was possible
for some to free-ride on the contributions of others. One type of free-
riding in this context is illegal access: that people connect to the system
without paying, or – which is possible in systems with ﬂat tariﬀs –
connect to the system at the lowest tariﬀ level and then, through re-
wiring inside the house, make it possible to use more electricity than
what is being paid for. Not paying for the electricity used was another
type of free-riding that emerged during the project, which is described
in more detail in Section 3.2. Thus, it became necessary to make sure
that the enforcement system functioned. In phase 2, the challenge (for
LUMAMA) was therefore to become a credible and legitimate enforcer.
In the following, we review theories from the literatures on state
building, corruption and clientelism that we argue are relevant to un-
derstand the challenges posed by the institutional context, and me-
chanisms behind the processes of successful institution building,
starting with the issue of trust (subsection 3.1) and then questions of
enforcement (subsection 3.2).
3.1. Building trust in a low-trust environment
For individuals to be willing to invest resources in a development
project, they must be convinced that they will, at some point, be able to
reap the beneﬁt of their eﬀorts. Some level of trust in the actor that is to
deliver the beneﬁts in the end is therefore necessary. The importance of
trust for reducing transaction costs is often highlighted, as it increases
individuals’ willingness to enter collaboration and risk-taking for future
gain [50].
Two commitment mechanisms are commonly discussed in the in-
stitutionalist literature. The ﬁrst is to make a commitment credible by
introducing some kind of mechanism through which the dominant actor
can be held accountable, which limits its ability to renege on the
commitment [51]. This strategy is often not an option within devel-
opment projects. When implemented by external NGOs, it is very dif-
ﬁcult for people in the area to hold the responsible organization ac-
countable by any formal means, even if failure of the project meant that
all the eﬀorts would be for nothing. Instead, the option available to
external development actors may be the second strategy discussed in
the literature, namely to go for a reputational solution to the commit-
ment problem ([52]: 59). This entails building a credible commitment
by signalling the organizations trustworthiness through repeated, po-
sitive interaction – a positive history of play [52,53].
In the literature, this approach is often discussed in relation to how
a government’s actions can promote or undermine trust. If a govern-
ment has a good track record in terms of delivering on its promises,
citizens are more likely to trust the government also in situations with
limited monitoring possibilities [54]. The perception that a government
is untrustworthy is related to its failure to keep promises.
Importantly, we should expect that attempts to convince people to
invest in an organization for long-term gain, through strategies of
building trust in the organization, face speciﬁc challenges in a context
where people are relatively poor, promises tend to be non-credible,
corruption is widespread, and generalised trust is low. Existing theories
oﬀer three insights on the speciﬁc diﬃculties and what these mean for
institutional strategies:
First, it is commonly argued that poverty tends to increase risk
aversion and shorten individuals’ time-horizons, making ‘uncertain and
distant rewards’ less appealing ([55]: 857). Widespread poverty creates
a group-level pattern of undermining long-term investments because
people with small or no economic margins ﬁnd it harder to prioritise
uncertain long-term gains above immediate needs.
Second, when it comes to the credibility of promises, we argue that
in contexts where people have bad experiences with political actors as
well as organizations – for example due to corruption – promises are not
worth much. In other words, a history of poor performance by political
actors and organizations may have negative consequences for future
actors to secure conﬁdence in their operations.
In terms of strategies for reducing the credibility deﬁcit (in a low-
credibility-situation where mechanisms for accountability are hard to
ensure), actors have two options: they can either invest in their cred-
ibility by building good reputation; or they can rely on intermediaries,
i.e. making use of already existing channels of patronage. Building a
credible commitment requires repeated interaction, suﬃciently low
discount rates for the future, and the possibility to observe actions
taken. Since building a good reputation is costly and time-consuming,
especially in a context where poverty is relatively widespread (and thus
the future may be heavily discounted), reliance on patrons is often a
tempting alternative [56].
While discussed in the context of political actors in new democ-
racies, these arguments are relevant also for development projects since
NGO-led projects often face a credibility deﬁcit that needs to be han-
dled somehow. In many cases this is done – intentionally or not – by
making use of existing channels of patronage, for example by colla-
boration with local elites [49]. The problem with such a ‘clientelism
shortcut’, however, is that it may undermine eﬀorts to build trust in the
organization itself. Where actors prefer to rely on patrons, they do not
invest in their own credibility [56]. It is, in our view, relevant to ask if
this mechanism can apply also to development projects led by NGOs.
Third, it has been pointed out in the literature that for a reputational
solution to the problem of credible commitment to work, it is crucial
that the actor giving a commitment never reneges on that promise. If
the actor defects at any point, people are likely to disregard future
promises from that actor ([52]: 59). Arguably, this is particularly re-
levant in contexts characterised by corruption and low trust, suggesting
that we cannot expect trust levels to rise swiftly after institutions have
improved. Low – or fragile – trust is likely to persist for long, and be an
ongoing challenge that needs to be handled.
3.2. Solving collective action problems: credible enforcement as a key aspect
of institution building
Free riding is commonly discussed in the context of public and semi-
public goods production as these require collective action, and brings
forth the common problems associated with such action [57,58]. In the
production of public goods, cooperation is obviously preferred to de-
fection. Nevertheless, this regulatory interest – shared by all – tend to
coexist with an individual interest in defection: the temptation to free
ride on the eﬀorts of others, which creates a CAP of the ﬁrst order [57].
Already in 1965, Mancur Olson argued that some kind of selective
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incentives (rewards or penalties) are necessary to make a group of in-
dividuals act in their common interest [58]. Elinor Ostrom conducted
pioneering studies of CAPs in relation to common pool resources, and
developed theories of collective action under such circumstances. In her
work, she highlighted the importance of, for example, self-determina-
tion, eﬀective monitoring and mechanisms of conﬂict resolution – but
also of trust and reciprocity [59–61]. CAPs are likely to be especially
severe where generalised trust is low, as in many contexts where de-
velopment cooperation projects are implemented. Even if people are
sympathetic to the goals of an organization, the suspicion that others
will not contribute may prevent them from doing their part [62]. In this
situation, institutional arrangements that enforce the rules are crucial,
since ‘in absence of the authoritative interpretation and enforcement of
the rules, it is particularly easy to ﬁnd excuses for breaking them’ ([62]:
240).
CAPs have gained increased attention in the political science lit-
erature, and legitimate coercion in order to solve free-riding problems
has been called ‘the fundamental problem of governance’ ([63]: 9).
Despite its relevance for international development cooperation, it is
more rarely discussed in that context (for an exception, see [64]). In
principle, many development projects in fact have the ability to be
“credible enforcers” [65] in that they can monitor compliance and have
the authority to exclude people who do not follow the rules. In reality,
however, development projects sometimes refrain from using their
enforcement power. There are at least two reasons why a development
actor may fail to use its enforcement capacities: First, since the raison
d’être for development projects is to help the poor, the actors with the
capacity to enforce rules may be very hesitant to do so, if it means
making poor people pay. Second, the social cost – especially for locally
employed staﬀ – may be seen as too high. The problem that enforcing
agents meet strong social disapproval has been called the ‘friendship
dilemma’ [66] and it is highly relevant for locally based organizations.
Development organizations have strong incentives to be responsive to
individuals’ preferences rather than to override them.
Responsiveness, however, is a democratic ideal that may bring new
challenges. In their account of state capacity development, D’Arcy and
Nistotskaya [65] argue that if democratic responsiveness is introduced
before an actor (the state) has established itself as a credible enforcer,
its capacity to override welfare-undermining preferences of individuals
will be reduced. This logic could in many cases be applied to the gov-
ernance of development projects that need cooperation and contribu-
tions from individuals who have incentives and possibilities to defect.
Still, an important diﬀerence between enforcement in this context and
how enforcement commonly is discussed in the literature on state ca-
pacity is that we study not mainly the existence of enforcement capacity,
but rather the choice to use or not to use this capacity.
The paradox is that despite being particularly sensitive in a devel-
opment cooperation context, enforcement may in fact be particularly
important to sanction free-riding in such situations. If there is no
sanction against people who do not pay their bills, willingness to pay
tends to decrease quickly. In order for electricity services to contribute
towards social and economic development – and in the longer time
perspective a reduction in poverty – reliability and quality of service are
equally important as aﬀordability. A well working system for payment,
together with tariﬀ levels above cost-recovery, is necessary in order to
achieve economic viability of local utilities. Hence, electricity provision
for free or at subsidised rates is criticised by scholars as being coun-
terproductive, as it drains utilities of resources needed to maintain and
extend service delivery [4,67].
Apart from its obvious function in limiting free-riding, we argue that
credible enforcement can also serve an important function during in-
stitution-building in contexts characterised by corruption and poor
leadership [68]. Where corruption is widespread, enforcement of rules
becomes arbitrary, as rules can be ignored upon the payment of bribes,
and leaders tend to bend the rules to their favour. In such a situation,
eﬀective and non-arbitrary enforcement sends a strong signal to the
community that the enforcing organization stands apart from the sur-
rounding institutional environment. This signal should be especially
strong if it becomes clear that old leaders cannot bend the rules of the
organization in their favour. Credible enforcement can thus help es-
tablishing an organization’s reputation as trustworthy.
This is related to the argument made by Margaret Levi about how a
government can both build and undermine trust depending on its ac-
tions in relation to enforcement. To show its capability to secure the
compliance of the otherwise non-compliant is a way to build trust, since
‘citizens are more likely to trust a government that ensures that others
do their part’ ([54]: 90). If citizens instead doubt that the commitment
of the government to enforce laws is not credible, the ability of the
government to generate trust will decrease.
A ﬁnal insight from the literature, is that the extent to which en-
forcement is seen as legitimate could impact on its ability to serve an
institution-building function. Given that ‘the best coercion is legitimate
coercion’ ([63]: 11), how can legitimacy in enforcement be achieved?
In a study of a large-scale land use issue, Grimes [69] found that
assessments of procedural fairness – citizens evaluating the design and
quality of procedures for decision making as more or less fair – did
positively aﬀect individuals’ trust for the authority as well as their
willingness to accept a decision outcome. Rothstein and Teorell stress
impartiality: more speciﬁcally, implementing institutions should be
impartial when exercising public authority; meaning that enforcing
agents “shall not take into consideration anything about the citizen/
case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law” ([70]:
170; see also [71]). This means that implementing actors should not
only be non-corrupt, but also refrain from giving special treatment due
to friendship, kinship, and personal likes and dislikes when enforcing
the rules. Impartiality in enforcement does not, however, contradict the
possibility to transparently set rules that diﬀerentiate between groups
in order to make services available also to the poor.
4. Methods
The analysis is based on empirical work conducted by the authors in
2013. A ﬁrst visit took place in 2012, followed by an in-depth quali-
tative case study in 2013. Together, the authors collected data during
3.5 months in Tanzania, with about nine weeks living in the electriﬁed
villages, and ﬁve weeks in the nearby town of Njombe. The following
analysis is based primarily on qualitative semi-structured interviews –
often undertaken with the help of a Tanzanian interpreter – with people
involved in the project. We have 119 interviews about the project (27
with project staﬀ, 81 with villagers, and 11 interviews and meetings
with local and district government). All interviews were done with
assistance by the same interpreter, who became familiar with the
communities and people, and she was instrumental in creating good
communication between the respondents and us as researchers. We also
hired a local person as our guide, and this person walked (or drove
sometimes) with us to people’s homes and made a ﬁrst introduction. In
order to ensure the quality of translations, we later had transcriptions
done by another person than the interpreter, hence, the translations
between Kiswahili and English were double-checked.
The material also includes notes from observation, informal inter-
action with villagers and project staﬀ, and project documentation. The
ﬁrst author has returned to the villages for shorter follow-up visits on
the project – including meetings and interviews – in 2014 and 2015.
The repeated visits have helped establish a relation characterised by,
over time, more open and straightforward communication and pro-
vided an opportunity to share results, discuss and reﬂect further, al-
lowing our analysis to be informed by knowledge of how things have
developed over time.
The joint analysis work was structured according to a coding
scheme, which we speciﬁed prior to analysis based on the research
questions and theoretical perspectives, and developed during the course
of coding material. Most material was coded using coding software, and
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all interviews were checked for concordance and divergence [72].1 The
work here builds on a signiﬁcant analytical work already undertaken
for previous publications (see [18,73]).
Since we were interested in the role of trust in making people
willing to cooperate, take risks and invest in the future, only verbal
statements such as the level of conﬁdence respondents have in an or-
ganization are likely to be of limited value. What we wanted to know
was whether their perceptions of ACRA – as trustworthy or not – were
consequential for their willingness to engage with the project. We
therefore did not ask the respondents explicitly about trust levels.
Instead, the interviews were as much as possible based on open ques-
tions, combined with more detailed follow-up questions on concrete
situations.
5. Case study
This case study section is organised into two parts, starting with the
question of how to build trust in a context characterised by low levels of
generalised trust, high levels of corruption and poor institutions (sub-
section 5.1). Thereafter, we address the question of how free-riding
problems can be handled (subsection 5.2).
5.1. Phase 1: building trust for long-term investment
As mentioned, ACRA needed signiﬁcant contributions in terms of
voluntary labour in the construction, and economic investments by
customers who needed to do internal wiring before service delivery
could start. Initially, ACRA found it diﬃcult to convince people that the
project was actually going to happen and that it would beneﬁt the
community at large. There was a general lack of trust in development
projects and promises made by outsiders. Many people said that when
they ﬁrst learned about the project they thought it was an empty pro-
mise. As one of the villagers, who came to be much involved in the
project, explained:
Local staﬀ member: For the ﬁrst time when they introduced this
project, I thought that it will not be possible (…) because we are in a
very remote area, so I thought that it was just politics. But later,
when they started construction, I started to believe that it is going to
happen because I saw some materials coming like the poles and
wires. (…) Finally I believed [it was true] after seeing the light
turned on.
Interviewer: What do you mean by politics?
Local staﬀ member: The issue of bringing electricity in our area
was ﬁrst mentioned by politicians (…) during their campaign. So
when this issue came again people thought it was the same issue,
which was mentioned every time by politicians without any im-
plementation.
This relates to theoretical arguments about challenges organizations
face when promises tend to be non-credible. It became clear that this
was a context where broken promises by outsiders are the norm rather
than the exception, and that this had a profound impact on how people
interpreted promises.
Many of the interviewees mentioned broken promises by politicians,
government oﬃcials and NGOs as a reason for not believing in ACRA
from the start.
Customer: At the time I did not believe it, because we were often
being promised things but we did not get them.
Interviewer: Who promised these things that did not happen?
Customer: The government, for example, was promising us many
things. For example, they promised to put tarmac on the road but
they have not yet done it.
Apart from the lack of trust in politicians, there was a clear cred-
ibility deﬁcit also for NGOs:
Customer: At the beginning, I thought it was just a lie. Because a lot
of Europeans [other than ACRA] were coming and did a survey of
the [water] intake and said that it was ok [but did not do anything].
Interviewer: When did you start to believe it would come true?
Customer: When they came and started to work. Because before,
other people came and just surveyed and then left.
Interviewer: Do you remember what it was like when ACRA ﬁrst
came, and said they wanted to bring electricity here? What did you
think then?
Customer: I did not believe it was true.
Interviewer: Why not?
Customer: Because many organizations [from outside of Tanzania]
were coming and said they would bring electricity, but they never
came back again.
This credibility deﬁcit for foreign NGOs is something that ACRA was
well aware about.
ACRA staﬀ: [T]here are so many associations led by European
persons, and maybe they failed or maybe they just promise some-
thing and it never happens; and here in Tanzania, the associations
from Europe or from … let’s call it ﬁrst world countries; they were
hundreds! In the beginning, they said: ‘This is one of the hundreds
(…) we can’t believe this.’
Facing this credibility deﬁcit, ACRA chose to invest in its own
credibility. One of the ﬁrst things ACRA did was to hold public meetings
in the three larger villages that were to be connected and to establish a
small working committee of elected men and women from each village.
This committee was involved in the work throughout the entire con-
struction.
What eventually led people to believe in the project – and be willing
to invest their time and labour in the construction, as well as their own
money in buying materials and doing internal wiring of the house in
order to be connected – was the way ACRA slowly built trust by being
very careful to not make any promises that they could not hold. Instead,
they promised small things that they were absolutely certain that they
could deliver – seedlings, paint, cement, etc. The importance of keeping
every little promise that was made was highlighted by several people in
the organization. As one staﬀ member put it: ‘You have to say what you
do and do what you say’. The rule was to never promise anything that
they were not 100% sure to deliver – 99% were not enough to make a
promise. The strategy of limited – and fulﬁlled – promises reoccurs in
the interviews as one of the reasons people began to trust ACRA.
Customer:When they [ACRA] promise something, they do it. There
is no instance when they have made a mistake.
Customer: The community has a primary school not far from here.
So ACRA said that ‘if you build we will bring iron roof, paint, nails’.
And they did. So when they promise something, they do it.
Moreover, ACRA added detail to the limited promises they made.
For example, not only did they say that they would bring certain goods,
or hold a meeting; they also said exactly when they would bring the
goods or hold the meeting. Again, this is noticed by people in the area
and becomes, to them, a reason to trust ACRA.
Customer: If they [ACRA] promise anything, they fulﬁl.
1 This means that we analyze and compared between interviews to identify points of
disagreement and contradiction, examining whether respondents have similar views,
concerns and explanations. It is a step in the analysis that helps assess the credibility of
inference.
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Interviewer: How do you know? What makes you sure?
Customer: They promised that tomorrow we bring poles, and then
they brought them the next day.
Notably, people perceived a diﬀerence between ACRA and
LUMAMA in how well they kept their promises.
Customer: At a very high percentage, everything ACRA is pro-
mising, they are also doing.
Interviewer: What if LUMAMA gives a promise?
Customer: I can’t say, because there are a lot of promises, but some
of them they fulﬁl and some of them they don’t fulﬁl.
When we asked follow up questions, it became clear that LUMAMA
had in fact delivered on the promise, only a bit later than promised. The
dramatic consequences of such limited failures can be better understood
if we take into account the speciﬁc challenges of the context.
As suggested in the theoretical section, where people have a lot of
experience with corruption and broken promises from leaders, trust in a
new organization can be expected to build slowly and stay fragile over a
long period of time. People’s perceptions and expectations about in-
stitutions could thus hold back trust in an institution, even if it is largely
credible. This proposition is supported by our data: as our interviews
show, even small deviations from a positive track record can have
consequences far beyond what we would expect in contexts with gen-
erally better institutions. The failure to deliver exactly as promised is
interpreted against a background of broken promises and has con-
sequences for trust in the organization.
In sum, ACRA built a positive reputation over an extended period of
time. There are two important lessons from this experience. The ﬁrst is
that it is, in fact, possible to make a credible commitment based on
reputational credibility also in a context as diﬃcult as the one in this
case – but it takes time. The second, however, is that when pursuing
such a strategy, there is no room for mistakes. Any deviation from a
positive track record may instantly undermine the hard-won trust.
Given the eﬀorts that are needed in order to strengthen the orga-
nization’s own credibility, it is easy to understand why some actors –
not least within international development projects – wish to ﬁnd
‘credibility short-cuts’. As discussed in the theoretical section, a
common strategy is to rely on existing patron-client relationships. In
many instances, it is necessary to establish collaborations with the
political elite in order to formally ‘enter’ the community and gain
permission to carry out projects. The local church acted as host for
ACRA, helping to establish relationships with all local political leaders
who gave their support for the project. Over time, the NGO distanced
itself from local political institutions and in many instances, chose not
to rely on local leaders. For example, ACRA soon decided to directly
employ and pay people to work on construction rather than to rely on
local politicians for mobilizing the villagers to do voluntary work.
ACRA also used institutional strategies in order to delimit the in-
ﬂuence by politicians on the project. First of all, politicians are not
allowed to have any positions of leadership in LUMAMA. This choice is
motivated in this interview with one of ACRAs (Tanzanian) staﬀ
members:
Local staﬀ: Politicians – they should not be candidates for election
[to the board of LUMAMA]. […] It’s something which we should be
very careful with because these people they do things to make sure
that their party is getting support. Let’s say, you have the elections
and somebody is a leader; a mwenyekiti, I mean, the chairman of the
board, and you are doing a party election. What do you think, if they
don’t have enough funds? They could take funds from LUMAMA and
begin to use it to do the elections.
Second, the organizational structure has three levels of decision-
making and these do not correspond to existing geographical borders of
local government. The lowest organizational level in the membership
based utility is the level of transformer (each transformer supplies
electricity to a speciﬁc area). The transformer groups select their re-
presentatives for the higher level of zone, at which the members in turn
elect representative for the General Assembly. The transformer groups’
geographical borders do not align with the local administrative borders.
This makes it hard for individual local leaders to say that the trans-
former is under his/her area of inﬂuence, and to use it for own pur-
poses.
5.2. Phase 2: institution building through credible enforcement
In the second phase of the project, when the power plant had started
functioning, new challenges appeared, this time related to enforcement.
This section illustrates the dilemmas involved in making enforcement
both credible and legitimate and at the same time being responsive to
poor peoples’ situation.
The ﬁrst years, the majority of households and public institutions
paid ﬂat tariﬀs, based on the number of power points in the premises.
Public institutions, households with higher consumption, many busi-
nesses and all milling machine owners had meters and paid a unit cost
per kWh, diﬀerentiated according to activity.2
In the area of Mawengi, people had no previous experience of
paying monthly bills or reading customer contracts. In 2013, the ac-
countant explained that LUMAMA was facing a challenge because many
customers did not pay their bills on time, which led to a budget deﬁcit
for the utility. In the interviews, various reasons why people did not pay
their bills on time were identiﬁed: lack of experience, distance to the
oﬃce and lack of money due to seasonal cash ﬂow – but also that
customers were not expecting enforcement, and that some held atti-
tudes that one can free ride. A collective action problem was clearly
present – the individual incentive to delay payment was working
against the common interest in a ﬁnancially sustainable electricity
utility.
Facing this challenge, the decision was taken that customers who
did not pay on time would be disconnected after only one month, rather
than after two or three months, which was the initial rule. In order to be
reconnected again the customer also had to pay a ﬁne of 25,000 TZS,
which is a substantial amount in this context.
At ﬁrst, people did not expect LUMAMA to enforce the new rule.
This was not an unreasonable expectation. As discussed above, devel-
opment projects sometimes refrain from using their enforcement power
– since they have strong incentives to be responsive to individuals’
preferences rather than to override them – which gives people a real
possibility to free-ride without being punished. LUMAMA, however,
chose a diﬀerent route. The ﬁrst month the new regulation was in force,
LUMAMA disconnected all households that had not paid the bill on
time. This was clearly against the preferences of the customers, and
something that was criticised by many in the interviews: while most
said that it is legitimate to disconnect those who do not pay their bills,
very few felt it justiﬁed to do so after only one month of delay. They
argued that LUMAMA should show consideration for how poor people
are. However, despite the negative reactions to this enforcement, it had
the intended eﬀect: after the customers had realised that the rules were
being strictly enforced, the number of delayed payments was drastically
reduced, and in the coming months, much fewer households had to be
disconnected.
As discussed in the theoretical section, one reason why locally based
development actors fail to use its enforcement capacities has been
called the friendship dilemma, meaning that the social cost of en-
forcement – especially for locally employed staﬀ – may be seen as too
high. The friendship dilemma was clearly present also in Mawengi. For
example, one of the employed local technicians explained how he felt
2 During 2014, the system with ﬂat tariﬀs has been replaced by a pre-paid system with
meters for all customers.
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very bad when they went to disconnect customers who were late with
payments.
Interviewer: When you go disconnecting people, how do they
react?
Technician: ‘I don’t like it (he shakes his head). I feel bad about it.
Even for the customer it is the same.
Not all staﬀ felt that using the sanction of disconnection was pro-
blematic. The manager and accountant saw it as a necessary and po-
sitive action. They were also strongly supported by ACRA staﬀ to en-
force the customer regulation, and they saw it as being their
responsibility in exercising good governance the way they had been
trained. In the encounter with customers about to be disconnected, the
manager refers to the contract which stipulates the rules:
Interviewer: Did you meet any of the people who you dis-
connected?
Manager: Yes
Interviewer: And how did they react?
Manager: Because we already announced so they knew that today
we are going to disconnect, so while we were disconnecting few of
them came to apologise and they paid so we didn’t disconnect them
and the rest came to pay for their bills and ﬁnes today.
Interviewer: Was anyone upset?
Manager: Yes, there are two people who were upset but they came
to pay for their bills and we gave them clariﬁcations and because
what we did is stated in our contract then they understood.
To illustrate the mechanisms through which free-riding problems, if
not dealt with, over time can threaten the survival of projects, we will
brieﬂy consider a contrasting case of rural electriﬁcation studied by the
ﬁrst author [74]. A Tanzanian NGO, TaTEDO, implemented a small
‘Energy Service Platform’ providing multiple services to the village
Leguruki in Arusha region in 2008. The NGO owned the system but it
was managed by a local village energy team and operated by a local
technician employed in the project. For grid customers, individual
monthly tariﬀs were based on planned consumption and individual
ability to pay. The decision was taken jointly by the energy team and
grid customers in a meeting. The procedure was thus democratic and
implemented a partial principle for setting of tariﬀs.
However, the collection of monthly tariﬀs became a problem after a
few months. Some grid customers delayed payments or refused to pay,
either because they were not happy with the service provided, because
they felt their tariﬀ was too high – or because they had heard rumours
that the NGO would pay for fuel, and they therefore expected that they
would not have to pay. The people on the energy team who were re-
sponsible for collecting payments found it socially challenging to con-
vince their neighbours and relatives to pay, i.e. they experienced the
friendship dilemma. They could have used the sanction of disconnec-
tion but chose not to. Instead, the lack of income made it diﬃcult to buy
new fuel and the committee had to reduce the hours of service delivery.
The reduced quality of service and the free-riding quickly eroded the
willingness to pay also among the other customers. Technical and in-
stitutional weaknesses combined to aggravate the economic situation.
As the NGO did not have funding to do necessary repair and extend the
system to more customers, local actors took the decision to stop the grid
service after about a year and half, and all customers lost access to
electricity. This brief example, when contrasted to the Mawengi case,
shows that the choices regarding enforcement that are made within
development projects can have profound consequences for project
success or failure.
Enforcement is also related to questions of legitimacy and social
status. ‘Treat all customers alike’ was a guiding principle for LUMAMA,
and one of its implications is that local leaders have to follow the same
rules as everybody else. On more than one occasion, LUMAMA dis-
connected local people with high social status.
Manager: In our project we don’t look at people’s positions, we treat
all customers equally, that is why we disconnected the [speciﬁes a
local politician] because he is not paying the tariﬀ. (…) So we just
follow what is in the constitution and our rules, I can even be dis-
connected, even the parish priest [the local church partner] could be
disconnected.
Recalling the theoretical discussion, impartiality in implementation
could have a legitimizing function [70]. The fact that sanctions were
used also against local leaders won the support of ordinary villagers – it
had a legitimizing eﬀect. In such instance, it served an important
function of making LUMAMA a credible and non-corrupt organization
in the eyes of villagers. From the interviews, it is clear that the fact that
also powerful people are being disconnected is considered a very good
thing by many:
Customer: If you delay the payment, all people are disconnected. It
does not matter who you are.
Interviewer: Do you think that this is a good thing or a bad thing?
Customer: It is a good thing. It is not choosing people
Customer: It is the same for all people.
Interviewer: Even a very powerful person?
Customer: [laughs] Yes, they disconnect for all.
Interviewer: What do you think about that?
Customer: They are putting all the people in equal position. No rich
and no poor. […] This is perfect because all people are equal.
Through the act of disconnecting people who normally are ‘above
the law’, LUMAMA has established its authority and the importance of
rules. This may be part of the reason why generally, villagers in our
study consider LUMAMA to be non-corrupt and doing a good job.
Many perceived the use of disconnection, also of ordinary people, to
be a legitimate sanction when bills were not paid. In many instances,
the fact that enforcement was ‘following the rules’ makes it predictable
and thus acceptable.
Interviewer: Have you been disconnected?
Customer: Yes.
Interviewer: What did you think about that?
Customer: It was just OK, they disconnected me because I was not
around; I was travelling. I came home and found that they had
disconnected. It was according to the contract so it was just OK. (…)
All the people know that if you can’t pay your bill, they disconnect.
Interviewer: Have you been disconnected?
Customer: Yes.
Interviewer: What did you think about that?
Customer: It was ok because I already got the information that they
were coming to disconnect.
In sum, the procedural fairness in enforcement – manifested not
least in a strong impartiality norm – had a legitimizing eﬀect. One in-
dicator that enforcement over time became regarded as legitimate is
that when it comes to illegal access people contributed to the en-
forcement by reporting on people who did re-wiring inside their homes.
However, while disconnecting local leaders is seen as legitimate,
and reﬂects positively on LUMAMA, disconnecting a poor family is not
considered equally legitimate. This indicates that eﬀective regulation
based on a ‘treat all customers alike’ principle is not necessarily per-
ceived as ‘fair’, since people may prioritise pro-poor rules over equal
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treatment.
Customer:My opinion is that LUMAMA should put the customers in
two categories: those who can aﬀord to pay and old people that are
taking care of orphan children. They should consider them more.
It is also with the purpose of being fair that the management of
LUMAMA makes its only deviation from the impartiality norm: in si-
tuations where customers failed to pay the bills because they had some
kind of crisis in the family – sickness or temporary economic diﬃculties
– the staﬀ sometimes lowered the level of the ﬁne that had to be paid
for reconnecting. For example, in a group discussion with the staﬀ we
learned that a woman who cried and was very polite when coming to
pay the ﬁne had paid only 10,000 TZS instead of the stipulated 25,000
TZS. The staﬀ felt they had to consider the family situation and told of
multiple occasions when they, in this way, compromised and deviated
from the principle ‘treat all customers alike’.
However, as other customers found out about this deviation from
the impartiality norm, it had consequences for the legitimacy of
LUMAMA. Some customers, being aware that the enforcement of ﬁnes
was not strict, drew the conclusion that a bribe had been paid:
Customer: The ﬁne is ok but the leaders are using segregation.
Because some people they can pay 20,000 and some they can pay
10,000. But all of them are disconnected.
Interviewer: Why do you think they do it diﬀerently?
Customer: These leaders in the oﬃce, they know; and maybe they
are getting something from these people that are paying less. It must
be that they are getting something. But I am not sure.
Interviewer: How do you know that people pay diﬀerent ﬁnes?
Customer: People talk to the community. […] So maybe those who
pay 10,000 tell their fellow customers they only paid 10,000. So
they make other customers jealous, to not feel good.
Again, this illustrates how in contexts characterised by corruption
and low trust, small deviations from an otherwise good track record can
have large consequences for an organization’s credibility. It is not
surprising that special treatment – even when it is done in order to be
fair – is interpreted as corruption, when this is how special treatment
tends to be achieved. Based on this, we suggest that actors seeking to
have ‘pro-poor’ approaches can handle this dilemma by being more
‘partial’ when formulating the rule, but to implement it impartially. The
point made by Grimes [69] is that procedures need to be such that
citizens judge them as fair and legitimate, or else they may see it ﬁt to
contest, circumvent or evade decisions.
To some extent, the staﬀ was aware of rumours of corruption but
felt the trust in LUMAMA was growing. The problem was attributed to
low levels of trust in the community, rather than the deviation from
rules.
Manager: This is something that is happening also with the tech-
nicians of LUMAMA. People are saying they are getting bribes but
you ﬁnd they are not. You ﬁnd maybe someone has a very large
house, and then you take more than one technician there to do the
work quickly. And then they think that people may have given them
bribes to do that.
Interviewer: Do you think rumours like this could undermine trust
in LUMAMA?
Manager: These rumours are not aﬀecting us; we just continue to do
our work. Instead of listening to the rumours we just continue to do
our work.
Interviewer: Do you think there are more rumours now than before,
or less?
Manager: At the beginning there were more rumours, but now it is
less.
Interviewer: Why do you think there is less now?
Manager: Because the result is good.
Survey data has showed that many Tanzanian respondents do not
report instances of corruption because they feel that no action would be
taken to resolve their complaint [47]. This problem is illustrated in
these quotes about a typical kind of corruption incident in the area:
Customer: Maybe two persons are having a quarrel. Then you go to
the local government. Then, you think that you have a case, but they
tell you the argument is over.
Local staﬀ: But if let’s say somebody does something and takes to
the village authority […] somebody gives the village chairman, or
whoever, some kind of bribe, then it ends up like that. Somebody is
not getting what is right. […] In that situation [as the one above]
who can they call? With the leaders, let’s say government leaders;
there is not much they can do.
Within LUMAMA, a complaint mechanism has been introduced. A
telephone number is posted everywhere, and on ﬂyers brought to the
meetings it says ‘in case you have a problem or you want to commu-
nicate, this is the number you should use for communication’. It is also
ensured that action is taken every time there is a complaint.
ACRA staﬀ: Everybody is to report or refer about cases of customers
that are complaining […]. It is their [LUMAMA management and
the LUMAMA board] duty to try to investigate immediately and not
wait until these rumours become something big. So that is also why
there was this reaction from LUMAMA to the [local leader who
spread rumours about LUMAMA]. Maybe it [rumours] is something
that will never end. What is important is to stop it, or to investigate,
or to show to the people that you are present – you, the Board of
LUMAMA – that you are consistent and you investigate it im-
mediately.
The challenges associated with building up a new local organization
and establishing it as trustworthy, non-corrupt and credible as an en-
forcer are signiﬁcant, context-speciﬁc and dynamic. As we hope that
these examples show, there is a constant interplay between wider in-
stitutional and contextual factors and the people involved in the pro-
ject. The process in Mawengi is unique, but we think it contributes some
insights of more general theoretical importance.
6. Conclusions
Through analysing a NGO-led small-scale electriﬁcation project
with a relatively successful institution building process this paper has
aimed at making a contribution to the literature on sustainable de-
centralized electricity provision, as well as the literature on institution
building in challenging contexts. The study contributes with a theore-
tically and empirically grounded analysis of political and institutional
challenges and strategies for sustainable electricity provision. It shows
how it is possible for local service organizations to build a credible
commitment through a positive track record also in a context char-
acterised by low levels of generalised trust and high levels of corrup-
tion. Also, it points to how these factors make the process more chal-
lenging: unlike a more stable institutional context where trust is
reasonably high, in this context any mistake could erase trust. In that
sense, this study indicates that the link between high quality institu-
tions and trust might be less straightforward than sometimes is ac-
knowledged. Whereas we should expect that trust is likely to diminish
in a context of poor institutions, we should be aware that the building of
good institutions is unlikely to give an immediate payoﬀ in the form of
high and stable trust levels. Rather, we should expect that good in-
stitutions and low levels of trust could co-exist for quite some time,
which has to be taken into account by all actors trying to build
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institutions in diﬃcult contexts. Moreover, as trust does rise, it is likely
to stay fragile over an extended period of time.
Consequently – and this is another conclusion from our analysis – it
is essential to set the expectations right. The people from ACRA whom
we interviewed underlined the importance of never increasing ex-
pectation beyond what is realistic; and, thus, never promising anything
that you are not completely sure to be able to deliver. Importantly,
ACRA also had a long-term perspective and could devote time to in-
creasing trust during a substantial period before the plant started op-
erating. This is not always (or usually) the case in development projects,
where arrangements can be insecure or temporary. Also, part of the
successful strategy was to create distance from existing institutions by
keeping local leaders at arm’s length instead of taking a ‘clientelist
shortcut’ which again is something that development projects some-
times do.
This study also shows that impartial enforcement can serve an im-
portant function in the institution building process, not the least by
deterring attempts at elite capture [68]. An emerging free-riding pro-
blem was solved through strict enforcement of a new rule regarding
disconnections. The enforcement came as a surprise to many people,
indicating that it was only with the new rule that LUMAMA established
itself as a credible enforcer. Moreover, by enforcing the rule also on
powerful persons, LUMAMA was able to show that it had ‘teeth’, and it
appears to have contributed to a widely shared view of LUMAMA as
both strong and legitimate (although contested by some people). Our
analysis suggests that while this enforcement came at immediate social
and emotional cost for the staﬀ, it contributed to long-term institutional
beneﬁts.
This study also contributes to our understanding of legitimacy in
terms of being seen as non-corrupt. Institution builders in contexts with
high levels of corruption and low trust are facing two herculean tasks
with regard to corruption: First, there is of course the challenge to build
an organization with a management that upholds high standards in
terms of good governance. The other challenge is to actually convince
people that the organization is non-corrupt. As we saw, very small
deviations from the impartiality norm [70] in enforcement led to ru-
mours of corruption, which may be enough to undermine conﬁdence in
the institution. In this case, the management sometimes accepted a
lower payment from people who were poor, upset, and genuinely
worried about the ﬁne. According to the interviews, this way of
handling the issue by the management ﬁt well with popular demand –
although tough enforcement was accepted in principle (and easily ac-
cepted when applied to powerful people) many respondents argued for
a softer approach towards poor families. However, when rules were not
strictly enforced towards the non-privileged, rumours of corruption
started to ﬂourish. In other words: in order to increase legitimacy by
abiding by a norm of fairness, LUMAMA deviated from the impartiality
norm, with the consequence that the organization’s legitimacy was
weakened in another respect – some people now thought that the
management was corrupt.
Finally, one lesson learned from this study is that building trust and
enforcing rules in challenging contexts takes time and comes with
substantial costs while the beneﬁts of doing so are long-term, and this
needs to be taken into account by actors working for sustainable local
electricity provision.
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